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Ownership of Foreign 
Corporate Equity 
Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
Investors in risky corporate capital face strong economic incentives to diver- 
sify their holdings not only across firms within their own country but also 
across firms in other countries.' The most commonly discussed method of 
such international diversification involves investing in  multinational firms 
based  in the home country that then invest throughout the world. The tax 
treatment of  investment abroad by multinational firms is extremely compli- 
cated and has appropriately been the subject of substantial research.  * 
Foreign direct investment is not the only means through which investors in 
one country can acquire ownership of equity in another country. The obvious 
alternative is for them simply to purchase shares in foreign equity in the se- 
curities market or to buy shares in a mutual fund that invests in foreign equity. 
These alternatives, known as portfolio investment, face a very different statu- 
tory tax treatment than foreign direct investment. In addition, while tax en- 
forcement is always a problem with investments abroad, enforcement prob- 
lems are likely to be far worse with portfolio investments than with foreign 
direct investments, to the point that portfolio investments abroad are often 
referred to as capital flight. 
Our objective in this paper is to estimate the degree to which differences in 
the tax treatment of  portfolio investments versus foreign direct investments 
Roger Gordon is professor of economics at the University of Michigan and a research associate 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Joosung Jun is assistant professor of economics at 
Yale University and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of  Economic Research. 
The authors would like to thank Smith W. Allnut III, Chris Gohrband, and Harlan King, all of 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis,  for helping obtain data on the composition of foreign equity 
holdings. They also would like to thank conference participants for comments on an earlier draft 
of this paper. 
1. See Adler and Dumas (1983) or French and Poterba (1991) for evidence on the substantial 
diversification achieved through purchase of foreign equity. 
2.  Many of the other papers in this volume, for example, as well as those in Ruin  and Slemrod 
(1990) analyze the tax treatment of foreign direct investment. 
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have affected empirically the relative use of  these alternative routes through 
which investors can purchase foreign equity. Our data set consists of  aggre- 
gate information, much of  it previously unpublished, on both portfolio and 
foreign direct investments in U.S. equity made by investors from each of ten 
other countries during the period 1980-89. 
The relative importance of portfolio equity investment versus foreign direct 
investment will be affected by more than just tax factors. When corporations 
invest abroad, for example, they acquire both ownership of and control over 
the foreign firms, whereas portfolio investors merely acquire ownership. This 
makes corporate investments more attractive to the extent to which there are 
synergy gains from joint operations of the domestic and foreign firms. In ad- 
dition, through use of  capital controls, some countries discourage portfolio 
investment abroad. In the empirical work, we attempt to control for the effects 
of these nontax factors on the relative importance of portfolio versus foreign 
direct investment. 
The principle conclusions of  the study are as follows. First, portfolio in- 
vestment is quantitatively important. In spite of the presence of capital con- 
trols (which restrict portfolio investments abroad) in half of the countries in 
our sample, portfolio investment in  U.S. equity from our sample countries 
was still on average about two-thirds the size of foreign direct investment from 
these countries. Yet  most studies of the taxation of international equity flows 
have confined their attention solely to foreign direct investment, thereby miss- 
ing an important component of these equity flows. 
Not  surprisingly, portfolio investment plays  a  much  more  limited  role 
among investors from countries with important capital controls. This is true 
even though these countries generally have much higher personal tax rates on 
dividends, a fact that in itself makes portfolio investment much more attrac- 
tive, given the ease with which domestic personal taxes can be evaded on 
portfolio investments abroad. Apparently, these capital controls are effective 
enough that the countries can impose high taxes on dividends without induc- 
ing much capital flight, making such taxes much more attractive. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the countries that eased capital controls during our 
sample period also tended at about the same time to lower their personal tax 
rates on dividend income. Given the substantial easing of capital controls in 
recent years and therefore the greater ease of capital flight, we would forecast 
both an increasing importance of portfolio investment in the future and further 
cuts in the personal income taxation of dividend income. 
By focusing our study narrowly on the form of ownership of foreign equity, 
we  avoided a number of complications that normally arise in  any study of 
international portfolio holdings. For example, Adler and Dumas (1983) and 
French and Poterba (1991) both emphasize the puzzling lack of international 
diversification of  equity portfolios. In our study, we  take as given the total 
holdings of foreign equity and focus solely on the form in which this foreign 
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international diversification of equity portfolios do not also affect the relative 
attractiveness of the two alternative forms of  ownership of foreign equity. In 
addition, many complicated factors can affect the degrees to which interna- 
tional capital flows take the form of debt versus equity. We  take as given the 
degree to which equity is used and focus solely on how this equity is pur- 
chased. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: In section 1.1, we analyze how 
taxes distort the relative attractiveness of  portfolio versus direct investment. 
Nontax factors are summarized in section 1.2. In section 1.3, we describe the 
measurement of  the various data series used in  the empirical work, and the 
empirical results are given in section 1.4. 
1.1  Tax Distortions 
In order to assess how taxes affect the relative attractiveness of  portfolio 
equity investment versus foreign direct investment, we compare the tax treat- 
ment of each type of capital flow. 
1.1.1  Tax Treatment of Portfolio Investment 
We  begin by analyzing the tax implications when an investor living in coun- 
try i buys directly a share of  equity costing a dollar in firm f  in country c. 
Assume that this firm earns pretax economic income, per share, of xd  Based 
on the tax code in country c, firm f  has taxable income per share of x;  and 
faces a statutory corporate income tax rate of  T:,~  resulting in corporate tax 
payments of T:x;.~  The firm’s income net of corporate taxes is therefore xcf - 
T:X;  = x,(l  -  P,<T;).  Here, p,,  = x;/x,measures  the ratio between taxable 
income and economic income for firms in country c, based on the tax law in 
country c. For simplicity of notation, let T=  = pCc7:. 
Assume that the firm pays out the fraction d of this net income as dividends 
each period. If the shareowner lives in country i, then this dividend is subject 
to a withholding tax  in country c at rate w,,.~ Individuals therefore receive 
income net of foreign taxes of xc,(  1 -  T,)(  1 -  doc,). 
In principle, shareowners still owe personal income taxes on this income. 
However, it is extremely difficult for a government to enforce a tax on foreign- 
source income.  In general,  taxes on individual investors are primarily  en- 
forced either by  requiring financial intermediaries to report directly to the 
government the income earned by domestic residents or by  withholding at 
3. For simplicity, we ignore variations in effective tax rates by firm. See Swenson (1990)  for a 
comparison, across U.S. industries,  of effective tax  rates versus the amount of  foreign direct 
investment in the industry. 
4. If the marginal tax rate varies with income, we adjust the measure of income here to produce 
the correct estimate of corporate tax payments. 
5. In  practice, this rate need not  necessarily equal the statutory rate applying to  capital flows 
between country c and country i.  Investing through a financial intermediary in a third country may 
result in a lower withholding tax rate. We  ignore these complications in the empirical work 16  Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
source. When individuals invest in foreign corporations through domestic fi- 
nancial intermediaries, these intermediaries can also be required to report the 
resulting income of each investor to the government, making enforcement 
straightforward.6  However, when residents invest abroad through foreign fi- 
nancial  intermediaries, neither approach is  feasible-these  intermediaries 
cannot be required to withhold taxes for another government or report infor- 
mation to another government.'  Since the home government has little ability 
to detect evasion in these circumstances, investors have little incentive to pay 
domestic taxes on such income. If they do evade domestic taxes, then their 
net income is simply .re( 1 -  T,)(  1 -  doci). 
If  individuals invest  abroad through  domestic  financial intermediaries, 
however, then the government should be able to monitor their earnings, forc- 
ing the payment of domestic taxes on this income.8 Under standard double- 
taxation  conventions,  such  individuals are  taxed  at  home  on  their  pre- 
withholding-tax dividends, hC,(  1 -  TJ,  but receive a credit up to the amount 
of any domestic taxes owed for the withholding taxes paid abroad. If the typ- 
ical personal tax rate in country i on dividend income is mi, then the net re- 
ceipts of shareholders equal 
In addition, the investors receive capital gains and may owe capital gains taxes 
if they sell shares. For simplicity, however, we ignore capital gains taxes. We 
will use expression (1) to describe the net receipts of portfolio investors even 
when  investors evade personal taxes.  When evasion  is  assumed, mi,  will 
simply be set equal to zero. 
1.1.2 
If individuals invest abroad instead by investing further in a domestic firm 
that then uses these funds to buy a dollar of equity in the same firmfin country 
c,  the tax treatment becomes much more complicated. To begin with, the tax 
treatment varies depending on the fraction of  shares in the foreign firm pur- 
chased by the domestic corporation. The United States, for example, requires 
that a domestic firm own at least 10 percent of the shares in a foreign firm to 
qualify for a credit for taxes paid abroad and at least 50 percent to be able to 
pool earnings from this  firm with  those from other majority-owned firms 
Tax Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment 
6.  Not all countries require this reporting by financial intermediaries. Without it, even taxes on 
earnings from domestic financial assets  are difficult to enforce except through withholding  at 
source. 
7.  Some countries have information-sharing  agreements with each other. These agreements, 
however, do not involve automatic transfers of information but cover only transfers of information 
about specific accounts which the home government learned about independently. But acquiring 
this independent information is a large part of the problem. 
8. The convenience of  using  a domestic financial intermediary may outweigh the extra tax 
burden. In principle, the net return given evasion should be reduced to reflect the inconvenience 
of using foreign financial intermediaries. 17  Taxes and Form of  Ownership of Foreign Corporate Equity 
abroad. The tax treatment also varies depending on whether the foreign firm 
is organized as a subsidiary or as a branch of the domestic firm. In the former 
case, domestic taxes are due only when profits are repatriated; in the latter, 
domestic taxes are owed each year on the entire  profit^.^ For simplicity, we 
focused on the dominant case, that of a subsidiary in which at least 50 percent 
of the shares are owned by the foreign parent. 
The pretax income per share, xd, of this subsidiary is, as before, subject to 
corporate income taxes at an effective rate T~.  Dividend payments remain sub- 
ject to withholding taxes in country c. If  the parent is based on country i,lo 
then the withholding tax rate is denoted by oh.  Commonly, ozi <  wcL,  in itself 
giving a tax advantage to foreign direct investment. If  the dividend payout 
rate is d, then income net of taxes in country c equals xcf(  1 -  T,)( 1 - do:,). 
Corporate and personal taxes may be owed in country i on the dividends 
received from this foreign subsidiary. In countries with a territorial tax sys- 
tem, such as the Netherlands, corporations do not owe tax on foreign-source 
income. Other countries (e.g., Canada and Germany) exempt from domestic 
corporate taxes any foreign-source income earned in  countries with which 
they have signed tax treaties. In these cases, the only additional taxes owed 
are personal taxes on the dividend income. In order to equate the dividend 
payout rate in  the case of  individual portfolio investment versus corporate 
direct  investment, we  assume that  all net-of-tax  dividends received from 
abroad are then distributed to individual investors. If  we  denote by  m:  the 
personal tax rate on this income, then the final net income equals” 
Most countries, however, tax the pretax income needed to finance the divi- 
dends received by domestic corporations from foreign subsidiaries but allow 
corporations a credit for any corporate and  withholding taxes paid abroad. 
These credits can reduce or eliminate taxes due on the foreign-source income 
but cannot reduce taxes due on any domestic-source income. Consider first 
the case of a multinational based in country i which invests only in firm f  in 
country c. This multinational receives dividends per share from abroad equal 
to dycf(  1 -  T,)( 1 -  ofi).  Under standard double-taxation conventions, it owes 
domestic corporate taxes on the corporate income, before both corporate and 
withholding taxes, needed to finance these dividends but receives a credit up 
to the domestic corporate taxes owed for all taxes paid abroad on this income. 
In particular, if  the subsidiary’s total income before any taxes, as defined 
9. Withholding taxes  are  also normally owed on the entire  net-of-foreign-tax profits of a 
branch but only on the dividends paid by a subsidiary. 
10.  For simplicity, we assume that the parent is located in the same country as the investor. In 
principle, the investor could own shares of  a parent based in a third country, or  the investment 
could be made through a subsidiary located in a third country, introducing further complications. 
11. Note that credits for withholding taxes paid abroad are not passed through the domestic 
corporation to individual shareholders. 18  Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
under the tax law of country i, is denoted by x;~,  then the parent owes domestic 
taxes at statutory rate 7; on the fraction of this income equal to the ratio of its 
dividend receipts to the subsidiary's income net of  corporate taxes paid to 
country c, and it receives a credit for the same fraction of the corporate taxes 
paid to country c, as well as for all withholding taxes paid. Net corporate taxes 
owed in country i on the dividend income dx,(l  - ~,)(1 - wzi) therefore 
equal 
or zero, whichever is larger. If p,,  is defined to equal xj/xcfand T,,  =  pC,7:, then 
the parent's  dividend receipts net  of  domestic corporate taxes equal,  after 
simple algebra, dxJ1  - .rc)min[(l -  wf,),(p,,  -  TJ/(~~,  - TJ], while the 
shareholders' income, including retained earnings but net of personal taxes, 
equals 
The role of p,,  in this expression deserves some discussion. If p,,  = 1 and a 
corporate surtax is due on repatriated income, then this income is taxed on net 
at the same rate as domestic-source income; foreign taxes are fully rebated. If 
p,,  < 1, however, then the effective tax rate on repatriated income is higher 
than that on domestic-source income if  T~,  > T=, and conversely. The under- 
statement of foreign-source income results in too large a fraction being taxed 
for a given amount of dividend repatriations, but it also results in a credit for 
too  large  a  fraction  of  foreign  tax  payments.  The net  effect  depends on 
whether the foreign or the domestic effective tax rate is larger. 
When a multinational invests in several foreign countries, it is normally 
allowed to pool the income repatriated from all of these countries and to credit 
against the domestic taxes due on this income any corporate and withholding 
taxes paid abroad on this income. In doing so, it can use excess credits from 
operations in one country to reduce any domestic taxes due on operations in 
another country. If, in total, its credits are sufficient to wipe out its domestic 
tax liabilities on its foreign operations worldwide, then no domestic corporate 
taxes result in particular from its operations in country c. In this case, its final 
net income is the same as in the territorial case, as shown in equation (2a). If, 
in contrast, its credits are insufficient to wipe out all domestic taxes due on 
foreign-source income, then it can receive a credit for all corporate and with- 
holding taxes paid in country c, even if these taxes exceed the domestic taxes 
due on repatriations from country c. In this case, its final net income equals 19  Taxes and Form of  Ownership of  Foreign Corporate Equity 
Through careful allocation of its investments and timing of its repatriations, 
a corporation should normally be able to avoid domestic corporate taxation of 
its foreign operations.’* Whenever it invests in a country with a low tax rate, 
where corporate and withholding taxes will be insufficient to offset domestic 
taxes, it can simultaneously invest in a country with a high tax rate. Repatria- 
tions should then occur simultaneously from each country, so that total tax 
payments abroad just equal total tax liabilities at home, precredit. Not  all 
firms may find this tax planning worth the effort. Planning sufficient to wipe 
out domestic corporate taxes becomes more difficult, if not impossible, when 
the domestic corporate tax rate is high. Therefore, in general, when pooling 
is allowed, some firms will earn net income described by equation (2a), and 
some will earn net income described by equation (2c). The percentage facing 
equation (2c) should rise as T~~ rises,  where we  denote the percentage fat- 
ing equation (2c) by 8.13  We therefore will use a weighted average of equation 
(2a) and  (2c) to measure the net income from corporate investments, with 
weights (1 -  8) and 8. To capture the relation between T,,  and 8,  we let 8 = 
a + bT,,.  Theory suggests that b > 0 and that 8  = 0 for relatively low  T, 
implying that a = -  bT’ <  0 for some low T’. 
Since 1986, the United States has required that repatriations from subsidi- 
aries that are not majority owned must each be put in a “separate basket,” 
preventing this pooling of credits. If  this applied to all firms, then net income 
would  be  measured by  (2b).  However, pooling of  credits is  still allowed 
among firms that are each majority owned. Therefore, for the United States, 
the new provisions should not change the incentives faced by most firms. We 
assume that pooling is the norm in the countries in our study which use a 
crediting system. 
Two of the countries in our study use a hybrid system. In particular, France 
and Italy exempt a certain fraction, e, of repatriated foreign-source income 
from domestic corporate taxes  .I4  On the remaining income, domestic taxes 
are due on the income received prior to withholding taxes paid abroad; the 
amounts paid  in  withholding taxes on  the remaining income can then  be 
claimed as a credit against domestic corporate taxes. Implicitly, foreign cor- 
porate tax payments are deductible from domestic taxable income. Net do- 
mestic corporate tax payments then equal dx,(l  - TJ(~  - e)(Tc, - o:,). 
After taking into account personal income taxes, a firm’s net income is 
12. For supporting evidence, see Hines and Hubbard (1989). 
13. Many other factors can affect the likelihood that a corporate surtax is due at repatriation. 
For one, economic and technological factors may cause multinationals based in one country to 
invest in a quite different set of host countries than do multinationals based in another country. In 
addition, some countries offer “tax sparing,” which reduces the  corporate surtax due on repatria- 
tions from selected countries. Funneling repatriations through these selected countries then re- 
duces the corporate surtax due on investments in country c. We have not attempted to control for 
these other factors. 
14. France exempts 95 percent of these repatriated earnings, while Italy exempts 60 percent. 20  Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
What factors affect the personal tax rate m:?  To begin with, m,*  should equal 
the  value  m,  would  take  ignoring  eva~i0n.I~  When  dividend  imputa- 
tion schemes are available to domestic investors in domestic corporations, 
however, my  but not m,  will be reduced. Under these schemes, an investor in 
country  i receiving dividends of 6 from a domestic corporation is imputed 
to have received dividends of  6/(1 - s,)  for some tax parameter s,,  which 
are then taxable under the personal income tax. However, the investor gets 
a tax credit of  s,6/(1 - s,).  On net, therefore, the individual owes taxes of 
(m, -  s,)6/(1 -  s,),  so that m:  = (m, -  s,)/(l -  s,).  Under a full imputation 
scheme, s, = 7:. On net, m:  is always less than or equal to m,. 
Countries, do, however, try to restrict investors’ ability to use the dividend 
imputation  scheme  on  dividends  from  domestic corporations financed by 
earnings from abroad. Typically, countries require that dividends eligible for 
the dividend imputation scheme be less than the firm’s after-tax profits from 
domestic operations. Unless a firm desires an abnormally high dividend pay- 
out rate, however, this restriction is unlikely to be binding. In the empirical 
work, we have assumed that these restrictions are not binding. 
What about evasion of personal taxes? When individuals buy shares in do- 
mestic corporations, in principle the government can require that these cor- 
porations report to the government the dividends paid to all domestic resi- 
dents,  making  the  tax  on  dividends easily enforceable.  Alternatively, the 
government can withhold taxes on dividends at source. Evasion cannot be 
ruled out, however. Some countries, for example, do not require firms to file 
such reports. Even if such reports are required, individuals can buy shares in 
domestic corporations through foreign financial intermediaries, making it dif- 
ficult or  impossible for the government to learn independently how much div- 
idends these individuals receive.I6 To  allow for the possibility of evasion, we 
will try replacing my  by min(m:,  0) in some of the regressions described be- 
low.  We  try this alternatively for  all countries and for just  the countries in 
continental Europe, where evasion seems to be more prevalent. 
So far, we have assumed that the dividend payout rate is the same for cor- 
porate and portfolio investments. In general, dividend payments result in ex- 
15. In principle, the two forms of investments may attract different clienteles. For example, if 
there are economies to scale in  learning about foreign investment opportunities,  only wealthy 
individuals will invest abroad directly. However, equity holdings are sufficiently concentrated in 
most countries that this is unlikely to make much difference. In addition, financial intermediaries 
such as insurance companies and pension plans may face restrictions concerning the amount of 
foreign securities they can invest in. Japan, for example, has had such restrictions, although they 
were eased somewhat in 1986. In principle, the composition of equity purchased outside of these 
intermediaries can be adjusted to offset the effects of such restrictions, but the offset is complete 
only if enough equity would be purchased outside of these plans. 
16.  In this case, however, the investor must pay the withholding taxes due on repatriations to 
the country of the foreign financial intermediary. Presumably, investors would seek out interme- 
diaries in countries facing low withholding tax rates. 21  Taxes and Form of  Ownership of  Foreign Corporate Equity 
tra taxes,  so firms should avoid dividend payments unless the nontax gains 
from these payments outweigh their tax cost. These nontax factors could in- 
clude cash needs of the shareholders (as in Poterba and Summers 1985), the 
desire to limit agency costs (as in Easterbrook 1984), or the signaling role of 
dividends (as in Bhattacharya 1979). With portfolio investment, the foreign 
firm chooses the dividend payout rate, based presumably on the nontax factors 
affecting its domestic shareholders. With corporate direct investment, in con- 
trast, the parent can choose separately the dividend payout rate from the sub- 
sidiary to the parent and the dividend payout rate from the parent to the share- 
holders,  in  each  case  based  on  considerations  affecting  shareholders  in 
country i.  To the extent that the firm gains from this extra flexibility, there is 
more of an advantage to corporate direct investment than is seen by comparing 
equations (2a) and  (2c) with equation (1). Hines and Hubbard (1989), for 
example, show that subsidiaries appear to time their payouts to their parents 
so as to avoid surtaxes at repatriation, while Hines (1991) reports that parents 
have much higher payout rates to shareholders than do firms without foreign 
subsidiaries, perhaps because signaling is more important for firms with for- 
eign operations. Firms therefore do seem to take advantage of  the flexibility 
they have over dividend patterns. 
Similarly, the above discussion assumes the same use of  debt finance re- 
gardless of the form of ownership. In general, firms in countries with high 
corporate tax rates should borrow relatively more, using bonds denominated 
in the currencies of countries with high inflation rates.  Multinationals may 
have extra flexibility, however.  For example, a multinational may face less 
risk of  default, since it can pool relatively independent risks from its opera- 
tions in two different countries and so be able to borrow more. In addition, if 
it can use its combined assets as collateral for loans, regardless of which firm 
does the borrowing, then it can concentrate its borrowing in the country where 
the deductions are more valuable. The gain from doing so would be greater 
the larger the difference in marginal tax rates applicable to interest deductions 
in the two countries. To  the degree to which multinationals respond to these 
differences, there is more of  an advantage to corporate direct investment in 
countries with extreme tax rates, both high and low, than is seen by comparing 
equations (2a) and (2c) with equation (1). 
We  have also ignored any flexibility multinationals have to shift taxable 
income toward  countries with  lower tax  rates.  They can do this  not  only 
through manipulation of the transfer prices used for goods and services traded 
between the subsidiary and the parent but also through such devices as the 
location of  ownership of  corporate patents. The gain from shifting a given 
amount of taxable income to the low-tax country is proportional to the abso- 
lute value of the difference in the marginal tax rates affecting income accruing 
in each country. 
17. See Gordon (1986) for further discussion. 22  Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
To try to capture the gains available to a multinational through reallocations 
of  interest deductions, and taxable income more generally, we include in the 
regression the absolute value of the difference in the statutory corporate tax 
rates in the two countries, abs(.r; -  T:).'~  Harris et al. (ch. 8 in this volume) 
find that reported profits of  U.S.-based multinationals vary as forecast with 
the corporate tax rates faced by their foreign subsidiaries, supporting this hy- 
pothesis. 
1.1.3  Comparison of Net Tax Rates 
How do the net tax rates compare on portfolio investments versus corporate 
direct investments? On portfolio investments, the investors' net income from 
an investment in firmf in country c equals x,(l  -  ~,)[1 -  dmax(rn,, o,,)]. 
On corporate direct investment by multinationals based in countries using the 
credit system, we have measured the net income from the same investment by 
a weighted average of equations (2a) and (2c) (with weights [l -  01  and 0) 
plus the gain from transfer pricing of  yabs(.ry -  T;), where y measures the 
relative importance of this term. 
After some simplification, the net tax advantage of portfolio investment can 
be expressed by 
dx,(l  -  T,)[w~,  + (1 - wf,)rn:  - max(m,, o,)1 
(3)  + 0dxc,(1  - m:>  [Ac,(T,, -  7,) 
-  wh(1 -  T,)] - yabs(.r; -  7;)  , 
where A,, =  (1 -  ~~)/(p~~  -  TJ.  This expression consists of three terms. The 
first term describes the tax advantage if  corporate investors owe no domestic 
corporate taxes when profits are repatriated. Corporate investors cannot claim 
a credit for withholding taxes against their personal tax liabilities, whereas 
portfolio investors can, giving an advantage to portfolio investments. Both 
withholding tax rates and personal tax rates tend to be lower, however, for 
corporate investments. The second term measures the extra tax burden corpo- 
rate investors face if  they are in a deficit-credit position and so pay  at least 
some domestic corporate taxes on repatriated earnings. The third term mea- 
sures the  tax  advantage corporate investors have  through  use  of  transfer 
pricing. 
In sum, portfolio investors gain because they may be able to avoid domestic 
personal taxes on their foreign-source income and by  construction they face 
no domestic corporate taxes at repatriation. If they do pay personal taxes, they 
can claim a credit for withholding taxes. Corporate investors, in contrast, may 
well owe domestic corporate taxes at repatriation. On their foreign operations 
as a whole, these domestic taxes are always nonnegative. However, by oper- 
ating in a particular high-tax-rate  country, they may  reduce their domestic 
18. The overall marginal tax rate on income accruing in each country may be more complicated 
due to the surtaxes when profits are repatriated. 23  Taxes and Form of  Ownership of Foreign Corporate Equity 
corporate taxes by using excess credits from operations in that country to re- 
duce domestic taxes due on other foreign operations, so that the second term 
in equation (3) can sometimes be negative. Corporate investors also often face 
lower withholding tax rates on their repatriations and can take advantage of 
transfer pricing.  Even if  their  shareholders cannot evade personal  income 
taxes, these personal tax obligations are reduced in countries that use a divi- 
dend imputation scheme. On net, the sign as well as the size of  the net tax 
distortion will vary by country and over time. 
For multinationals based in territorial countries, no corporate surtaxes are 
due at repatriation, so that the second term in equation (3) would be zero. For 
France and Italy, however, which use a hybrid system, this second term would 
equal the corporate taxes due at repatriation and so would equal dx6( 1 -  7,) 
(1 -  e)(l -  WZ;)(T=~  -  wfi). 
1.2  Nontax Factors 
Many nontax factors also affect the relative importance of portfolio versus 
corporate investments abroad. One key difference between the two is that cor- 
porate investments abroad allow joint control and operation of production in 
the two countries, whereas portfolio investments just affect ownership of the 
firm’s income. Consider, for example, the situation of a firm based on country 
i that owns a distinct product or technology that can profitably be manufac- 
tured in country c. This could occur because factor prices in  country c are 
more favorable (e.g., wage rates are lower, and the firm’s production is rela- 
tively labor intensive); it  could occur because transportation costs make it 
cheaper to produce the good nearer the foreign customers (e.g., shipping the 
syrup for Coca-Cola is cheaper than shipping the bottled soda); it could occur 
because trade barriers prevent sales of the product to foreign customers unless 
the good is produced locally; or it could result from the greater ease of adjust- 
ing the product to accommodate local tastes if production occurs on site or if 
the distribution outlets are owned by the manufacturer.  l9 These advantages 
may be sufficient to induce corporate investment in country c even if it is taxed 
less favorably than portfolio investment in country c. The greater the tax dis- 
advantage of corporate investments, the more important these nontax advan- 
tages must be to justify the investments. 
All of these pressures are based on the premise that firms in country i have 
some distinct products or technologies. The more this is the case, therefore, 
the greater these nontax pressures, everything else equal. We proxy the degree 
to which firms in a country own distinct products or technologies by a mea- 
sure of the R&D effort in that country.*O 
19.  For an extended discussion of nontax factors, see Dunning (1985). 
20.  Because  we only examine the pattern of foreign investments made  in one country,  the 
United States,  we cannot readily test  the effects of  variation in the characteristics of  the  host 
country, such as the severity of trade barriers. 24  Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
When the nontax advantages of investing in country c are large, what op- 
tions does a firm have to reduce or eliminate any tax disadvantages of this 
investment? One option would be to license use of  the technology to firms in 
country c, thereby allowing the technology to be used there while limiting the 
extent to which tax-disadvantaged investment must occur in country c. While 
transferring the technology to a subsidiary may allow better control over use 
of the technology, better control over access to information about the technol- 
ogy, and better transfer of information about the detailed characteristics  of the 
technology, taxes may outweigh these advantages of common ownership. 
When the gains from joint operations arise from other sources, other types 
of contractual links may arise which allow the firm to avoid tax-disadvantaged 
capital flows. For example, if the gain from joint operation is simply common 
control over pricing, then cartels might be set up instead to coordinate pricing. 
Similarly, distribution outlets can be  arranged through contractual links, as 
with chain stores, rather than through direct ownership. 
If  common ownership is essential for nontax reasons, then another option 
is to have the user of the technology in country c buy the owner of the tech- 
nology in country i.  Tax considerations would normally favor one direction of 
capital flow over the other. Ignoring withholding taxes and personal taxes, for 
example, the tax loss from corporate direct investment results from the cor- 
porate surtax that may be due when profits are repatriated to the parent cor- 
poration. When' the multinational is operating in a high-tax and  a low-tax 
country, then this surtax would be due if profits are repatriated from the low- 
tax to the high-tax country, but not conversely. In this case, therefore, joint 
ownership should occur through the firm in the low-tax country raising funds 
worldwide to finance the purchase of the firm in the high-tax country. If direct 
investment from country i to country c is tax disadvantaged, direct investment 
from country c to country i is likely not to be. 
In certain cases, however, gains from joint operation may well require pay- 
ing the extra taxes that result from a firm in a high-tax country taking over a 
firm in a low-tax country. For example, when operations of the potential mul- 
tinational in one country are much larger than in the other countries, then it is 
much easier for this firm to acquire the other firms. If so, how large a capital 
flow is needed to acquire the gains from joint operation, and are further gains 
possible through larger capital flows? Everything else equal, the surtax paid 
will be proportional to the size of the capital flow, providing an incentive to 
minimize the amount of direct investment. This can be done by purchasing a 
smaller share of the equity in the subsidiary or by using relatively more debt 
in  financing investments there. It might also be done by  setting up a joint 
venture, in which most of the financing comes from the foreign partner. The 
share of the profits going to the firm in country i can be adjusted as needed to 
reflect the value of the technology it contributes to the joint venture. In each 
case, corporate direct investment from country i to country c is reduced or 25  Taxes and Form of Ownership of Foreign Corporate Equity 
eliminated while the companies still maintain the economic advantages of 
joint operation. 
A variety of other nontax factors could also prove to be important. One 
obvious one is the use of capital controls in a number of the countries in our 
sample. These controls can take a variety of forms. France, for example, had 
regulations from 1981 to 1986 which allowed the purchase of foreign assets 
only from other French residents, in principle preventing any increase in port- 
folio investment abroad.  Italy,  in  contrast,  required  that  residents deposit 
funds equal to 50 percent of  the amount invested abroad in an interest-free 
account. We  see no way to capture directly the effects of such diverse regula- 
tions on equity flows. 
In order to test for the possible importance of capital controls, we simply 
included a dummy variable, denoted by C,,, which is set equal to one if signif- 
icant restrictions exist in that country in that  year on portfolio investment 
abroad. We  experimented with alternative definitions of “significant.” Coun- 
tries with capital controls would be expected to have less portfolio investment 
abroad. We  also tested to see whether controls make portfolio investment less 
responsive to changes in tax incentives. 
1.3  Data on Relative Tax  Rates and the Composition of Capital Flows 
In order to test the sensitivity of  the composition of  international capital 
flows to these tax incentives, we collected data on the relative tax treatment of 
portfolio versus direct investment in the United States coming from each of 
ten other countries, and the composition of capital flows to the United States 
from each of these countries during the period 1980-89.  The ten countries are 
Australia,  Canada,  France,  West  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.21 
1.3.1  Relative Tax Rates 
In total, we needed data for m,,  my, wcL,  colt, T,,  T=~,  T;, A=,,  R&D intensity, 
and the dummy variable C,,  measuring the presence of capital controls, yearly 
from 1980 to 1989. 
mi 
To begin, we set mi equal to the top marginal tax rate prevailing in country 
i in each year. Where appropriate, we took into account both federal and local 
tax schedules. Given the concentration of wealth holdings among investors in 
the top tax brackets and given the greater tendency among those in the highest 
21.  Data were also available for Bermuda and the Netherlands Antilles, but we decided not to 
include these data because the above theory was not designed to address the consequences of 
investing from country  i to country c through some third country j. 26  Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
tax brackets to invest in equity, this assumption seemed reasonable.22  Data on 
these rates were taken from various issues of Coopers and Lybrand’s Interna- 
tional Tax Summaries.23  The resulting tax rates for the period  1980-89  are 
reported in table 1.1. In most of the regressions, however, we set mi  equal to 
zero, on the presumption that individuals can easily evade domestic taxes on 
portfolio investments abroad. 
rn. 
To calculate m,*,  we used our estimate of  the top marginal tax rate along 
with information about the characteristics of any dividend imputation scheme 
available in country i in that year (Coopers and L~brand).~~  The resulting tax 
rates are reported in table 1.2. 
wi and 0. 
Here we simply used statutory rates for dividend payments from country c 
to country i in that year (Coopers and Lybrand). These withholding tax rates 
are reported in table 1.3. The figures ignore the possibility of firms routing 
dividend payments through a third country.  25 
7: and 
In each case, we used the statutory rate that applied to the largest firms in 
that year (Coopers and Lybrand). When state or provincial governments in 
that country also taxed corporate profits, we used a combined tax rate.26  This 
approach does not take into account the possibility that firms may have tax 
losses and so face a zero marginal tax rate or may be subject to supplementary 
taxes (e.g., an alternative minimum tax). When the statutory tax rate changed 
during the calendar year, we used a weighted average tax rate. The resulting 
tax rates are reported in table 1.4. A few of the countries in the sample use a 
split-rate system, taxing retained income at a different rate than that used for 
income paid out as dividends. For these countries, both rates are reported in 
table 1.4. 
22.  This ignores,  however,  purchases  of  equity  by  financial intermediaries  (e.g.,  pension 
plans), which are subject to very different tax treatment. When we test for evasion of personal 
taxes on all purchases of equity setting m, = m:  = 0, this also provides a test for the possibility 
that equity purchases mainly occur through pension plans. 
23.  Data from Australia and the United Kingdom were adjusted in certain years to take account 
of the difference between their fiscal year and the calendar year. 
24.  When tax changes occurred in midyear, we used a weighted average tax rate for that year. 
25. This omission creates a problem only to the degree to which the opportunities differ by 
country or over time. But the size of the withholding tax to be avoided differs very little across 
countries or over time, as seen in table 1.3, whereas access to tax havens should be very similar. 
Therefore, our results should be robust to this omission. 
26.  Where possible, we attempted to duplicate the procedure for calculating the combined rate 
used in Pechman (1988). For Switzerland, the combined rate is the maximum rate payable by a 
corporation operating out of Zurich. 27  Taxes and Form of Ownership of Foreign Corporate Equity 
Table 1.1  Top Individual Income Tax Rates (percentage) 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Japan  80  80  80  80  78  78  78  76  76  65 
Canada  63  63  50  50  50  50  55  52  46  47 
France  60  60  65  65  65  65  58  57  57  57 
West Germany  56  56  56  56  56  56  56  56  56  56 
Netherlands  72  72  72  72  72  72  72  72  72  72 
UnitedKingdom  60  60  60  60  60  60  60  60  45  40 
Italy  72  72  72  65  65  62  62  62  62  50 
Sweden  86  86  87  83  82  79  79  76  74  72 
Switzerland  23  23  23  20  20  19  19  14  16  16 
Australia  60  60  60  60  60  60  59  53  49  49 
~ 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Coopers and Lybrand (1980-1989). 
Notes:  Combined  federal  and  local  rates  are  reported  where  applicable.  When  the  tax  rate 
changed during the calendar year, a weighted average tax rate is used. 
Table 1.2  Top Individual income Tax Rates, Net of Divided Tax Credit 
(percentage) 































75  75  73  73  73 
36  36  36  36  42 
48  48  48  48  37 
31  31  31  31  31 
72  72  72  72  72 
43  43  43  43  44 
63  53  45  41  41 
87  83  82  79  79 
23  20  20  19  19 
60  60  60  60  59 
70  70  56 
43  38  39 
36  36  36 
31  31  31 
72  72  72 
45  26  20 
41  41  22 
76  74  72 
14  16  16 
29  8  16 
Source; Authors’ calculations based on Coopers and Lybrand (1980-1989)  and table 1.1. 
Table 1.3  Withholding Tax Rates on Dividends (percentage): Corporate Recipient/ 
Individual Recipient 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Japan  10115  10115  10115 
Canada  15  15  15 
France  5/15  5/15  5/15 
West Germany  15  15  15 
Netherlands  5/15  5/15  5115 
United Kingdom  5/15  5/15  5/15 
Italy  5/15  5/15  5/15 
Sweden  5/15  5/15  5/15 
Switzerland  5/15  5/15  5/15 
Australia  15  15  15 
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Table 1.4  Statutory Corporate Tax Rates (percentage) 


























































































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on Coopers and Lybrand (1980-1989). 
Notes: Combined federal and local rates are reported where applicable. When the tax rate changed during 
the calendar year, a weighted average rate is reported. 
*In a split-rate system, the first rate applies to retained earnings and the  second to dividends. 
7,)  T~~,  andAci 
By  definition, T, = (TL~X:~))/X~~,  and T,~  = (-r;x$r)/xcf  In each case, the nu- 
merator equals actual tax payments and the denominator equals economic in- 
come, so that the ratio measures an effective corporate tax rate. For T=,  this is 
the effective corporate tax rate on foreign holdings in the United States. Most 
firms operating in the United States will have at least some foreign owners, 
though the fraction will vary by firm. We  simply assumed that the effective 
tax rate on foreign holdings is the same as that on firms as a whole operating 
in the United States, regardless of ownership, so we measured T, by the ratio 
of actual corporate tax payments to a measure of economic income.27  Specifi- 
cally, we measured T, by the ratio of direct taxes on income to operating sur- 
plus less net interest paid for the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector (as re- 
ported in OECD 1980-1989). 
In measuring T~~,  the appropriate definition was less clear, because existing 
data sources do not report directly the average tax rate on foreign-source in- 
come. As a result, we explored several alternative approaches. The first and 
simplest approach was to set T,~  equal to T:~,  the statutory tax rate. This defi- 
nition would be appropriate if  each country defined taxable foreign-source 
income based on some approximation to economic income-for  example, it 
did not extend various subsidies such as investment credits or accelerated de- 
preciation to capital invested abroad. This in fact approximates  the U.S. law. 
27.  Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (cb. 7 in this volume), however, found that the average 
tax rate paid by foreign subsidiaries in the United States was much less than that paid by other 
firms. We assume that this is due to financial arbitrage engaged in by these firms, measured in our 
theory by yabs(.r: -  T:), rather than to differences in the tax treatment of foreign-owned firms. 29  Taxes and Form of Ownership of Foreign Corporate Equity 
Our second approach assumed implicitly that each country measures U.S .- 
source taxable income based on the U.S. tax rules, implying that firms do not 
in  practice recalculate their  taxable income  when  profits  are repatriated. 
In this case, T,,  = T;(x~.x@)  = T;(T&).  Given this approach, T~,  -  T, = 
P,,(T:  -  7:) so that differences in effective tax rates are measured by differ- 
ences in statutory tax rates, up to a multiplicative factor. 
Our third approach assumed that foreign-source income is measured based 
on the domestic tax law in each of these countries, without modification due 
to its foreign source. As a first pass, the average tax rate on foreign-source 
income should then equal that on domestic-source  income.28 
Yet a fourth approach to measuring T,, would have been to infer the effective 
tax rate based on the user cost of capital in each year, constructed using de- 
tailed information about corporate tax provisions. This is the approach used, 
for example, in Slemrod (1990). As argued in Bradford and Fullerton (1981), 
this measure of  the effective tax rate can be  very sensitive to assumptions 
made about such things as the required rate of return. More important, if re- 
ported earnings are not coming primarily from the return to marginal capital, 
as argued in Gordon and Slemrod (1988), then an effective tax rate measure 
based on the user cost of capital will be very misleading. Instead, the statutory 
rate should become more important. This provides an alternative justification 
for our second approach to measuring T,,,  which results in a comparison of 
statutory tax rates. 
One complication for each of  these definitions is the existence in  some 
countries of a split-rate corporate tax system in which the tax rate on retained 
earnings is different than the tax rate on earnings paid out as dividends. As 
seen in equation (3), the only place that T=, enters relates to the tax treatment 
of dividend payments. Therefore, for the first two definitions of  T,,,  we used 
the statutory rate applied to earnings paid out as dividends in countries with a 
split-rate corporate tax system. Things are a little more complicated under the 
third definition. Here T~,  refers to the average corporate tax rate for earnings 
paid out as dividends. We  observed only the average tax rate on earnings, 
whether retained or paid out, which we  denote by  q,.  We  estimated T,,  by 
assuming that the average tax rate on retentions has the same relation to the 
statutory tax rate on retentions as the average tax rate on payouts has to that 
statutory tax rate. 
Only the third definition for T,,  required new data. We  measured the average 
corporate tax rate in country i using the same procedure and data source used 
in measuring T,.  There were missing data in these publications, however, for 
Canada, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. For Canada, we found com- 
28.  The two average tax rates can still differ for various reasons. For example, given the lack 
of indexation for inflation in the definition of taxable income in any of these countries, the effec- 
tive tax rate on foreign-source income should differ from that on domestic-source income due to 
any differences in the inflation rates in the  two countries, for the reasons discussed in Feldstein 
(1 980a, 1980b). 30  Roger H.  Gordon and Joosung Jun 
parable data in the Corporate Financial Statistics issued by Statistics Canada, 
which we used to calculate the Canadian rates. For Switzerland  and the United 
Kingdom, however, we were not able to find even roughly comparable data, 
so we used instead the statutory corporate tax rate. The resulting measures of 
the average corporate tax rate are reported in table 1.5. These figures are sur- 
prisingly volatile, often changing substantially from one year to the next. In 
four cases, all during the early 1980s, the resulting tax rate exceeds 100 per- 
cent. The cause of this volatility is unclear, It could be caused, for example, 
by  the importance of no loss-offset during the recession in the early 1980s. 
Alternatively, if  investment credits on new investment or rapidly accelerated 
depreciation allowances are used to offset heavy future tax payments, then 
observed tax rates will be unusually high during periods of low investment, as 
in the early 1980s, and conversely. It seems unlikely that firms would respond 
much to these year-to-year fluctuations in incentives, even if  the incentives 
were measured correctly-behavior  should respond to a weighted average of 
expectations of future as well as current tax incentives. Given these problems, 
this measure seems much weaker than either of the first two measures. In 
practice, these first two definitions are very similar. In the empirical work, we 
focused on the second measure but report selected results using the other two 
measures for T~~. 
We also needed to measure Ac, = (1 -  -rC)/(pcl -  TJ.  Here we made use of 
the relation p,,  = T,~/T;  and substituted the appropriate measure of each of the 
tax variables. 
RbD  Intensity 
We  measured R&D intensity in year t by  the average value in country i of 
R&D divided by gross domestic product (GDP) during years t -  3 to t - 1; 
we denote this average ratio by R,t.29 
C,! 
This variable was set equal to one for country i in those years in which there 
were substantial capital controls. Some important controls existed in Australia 
(1980-84), France (1981-86),  Italy (1980-87),  Japan (1980-86), and Swe- 
den (1980-88).  Our loosest definition of capital controls sets C,, = 1 during 
each of  these years. The nature of  these controls differed substantially by 
country and over time, however. For example, Italy during the period of con- 
trols required that residents deposit funds equal to 50 percent of  the amount 
invested abroad in an interest-free account, thereby sharply discouraging open 
ownership of  foreign equity. These controls were gradually phased out during 
1983-87.  In contrast, during 1981-86, France prevented investors from pur- 
29.  A one- to three-year lag between R&D expenditures and available technology is represent- 
ative of the results found in empirical productivity studies, such as Griliches (1980). 31  Taxes and Form of  Ownership of Foreign Corporate Equity 
Table 1.5  Average Corporate Income Tax Rates (percentage) 
1980 
~  ~~ 























51  SO  48  46  46  42  44  45  53 
14  18  17  14  13  7  7  5  5 
71  117  41  40  31  27  35  32  32 
125  52  51  33  30  30  45  42  67 
77  128  106  47  44  49  51  45  39 
37  33  30  28  26  29  31  31  32 
Source; Authors’ calculations based on OECD (1980-1989). 
Note: See the text for an explanation of the tax rates larger than 100 percent 
chasing equity from abroad, but existing holdings of foreign equity could con- 
tinue without penalty  and be traded  within France.  As a result,  the French 
provisions should not in themselves have lowered portfolio holdings abroad 
but would have prevented  individuals from responding to any increase in in- 
centives for further portfolio  investment abroad. During  1980-86,  the main 
restriction in Japan involved tight limits on the amount of foreign securities 
that financial  intermediaries  could purchase.  Because Japanese investors di- 
rectly own relatively little equity, these controls may well have affected aggre- 
gate portfolio investment in foreign equity even though they did not restrict 
direct purchases  of  foreign equity. Our strictest definition of capital controls 
assumed that  the  Japanese  provisions  did  not  affect  equity  flows,  that  the 
French regulations had no effect, and that Italy had effectively ended is capital 
controls during 1987. The third and main definition  we focused on was an 
intermediate case in which we weakened this latter definition by assuming that 
the Japanese controls were binding through 1986. 
What do these numbers imply for the differential tax treatment of portfolio 
versus  direct  investment  from each of  these  ten  countries  into  the  United 
States? As seen in equation (3), the net tax advantage to portfolio investment 
consists of three terms, the first measuring  the tax differences assuming no 
corporate surtax when profits are repatriated,  the second measuring the cor- 
porate surtax assuming that firms are in a deficit-credit position, and the third 
measuring  the potential gain from shifting taxable income between the two 
countries. Given the estimates of the various tax parameters reported in tables 
1.1-1.5,  we calculated each of  these terms. The resulting values for the first 
tax term are reported  in tables  1.6 and  1.7, making alternative assumptions 
about evasion; those for the second tax term are reported in table  1.8; those 
for the last term are reported in table 1.9. Table 1.6  Personal Tax Advantage to Portfolio Investment: No Evasion 
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Table 1.7  Personal Tax Advantage to Portfolio Investment: Evasion 
~~~~~~ 

















































































































The  figures  in  table  1.6  report  the  value  of  (1  -  T,)[w:,  + 
(1 -  w:,)m:  -  max(m,, wJ],  assuming no evasion of personal income taxes. 
These figures suggest substantial variation across countries in the personal tax 
treatment of portfolio versus direct investment. Most of  this variation is due 
to the effects of dividend imputation schemes. France, Germany, Italy, and the 
United  Kingdom  all  have  important  imputation  schemes,  and  Australia 
adopted such a system in  1987, as can be  seen comparing the values of  m, 
versus m:  in tables 1.1 and 1.2. The result, as seen in table 1.6, is a substantial 
personal tax advantage to direct over portfolio investment in these countries. 
Canada and Japan have less important imputation schemes, yielding only a 
slight tax advantage to direct investment. Personal taxes made little difference 
in the other countries. If personal taxes on portfolio investments are evaded, 
then the results change dramatically, as seen in table 1.7, where this expres- 
sion is reevaluated under the assumption that m, = 0. Now there is a dramatic 
personal tax advantage to portfolio investment. 
Table 1.8 reports the size of the corporate surtax, assuming that firms are in 
a deficit-credit position. For countries which exempt foreign-source income, 
the corporate surtax is zero. For Italy and France, which use a hybrid system, 
the corporate surtax term instead equals (1 -  ~,)(1  -  m:)(l  -  e)(T,, -  w:,). 
For countries using a crediting system, the term equals (1 -  m:)  [A,,(T,, -  T,) 
-  w:,( 1 -  T,)].  In the figures in table 1.8, T~~  is set equal to T;(T)T;).~O  These 
tax terms are generally smaller than those reported in table 1.6 and dramati- 
cally smaller than those in table  1.7, suggesting that differences in  the per- 
sonal tax treatment of portfolio versus direct investment are much more im- 
portant. 
The term measuring the potential gain from transfer pricing is reported in 
table 1.9. For countries with a split-rate corporate tax system, we use the tax 
rate applied to retained earnings. 
30.  The figures under the two alternative measures of T,, are qualitatively very similar. Table 1.8  Corporate Surtax at Repatriation 
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Table 1.9  Difference in Statutory Corporate Tax Rates 

















































































0.118  0.174 
0.070  0.090 
0.OOO  0.030 
0.110  0.170 
0.030  0.013 
0.100  0.040 
0.013  0.073 
0.067  0.127 
0.125  0.076 













1.3.2  Data on the Composition of Capital Flows 
The initial source of data for direct versus portfolio investment by residents 
of country i in U.S.  equity came from the Survey of  Current Business, using 
data compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  These accounts, how- 
ever, report data on direct investment in equity only from Canada, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Similarly, the published tables include 
data on portfolio investment  in equity only for investors from Canada and 
Japan. Smith W.  Allnut I11  of the Bureau of Economic Analysis kindly pro- 
vided us with internal  estimates of direct investment in U.S. equity for the 
other six countries in our sample, and Harlan  King, also of  the Bureau  of 
Economic Analysis, provided us with estimates of portfolio equity investment 
in the United States for the remaining eight countries. 
Inevitably, these data do not  measure precisely  what  we want.  To begin 
with, if a corporation investing  in a foreign  firm does not own at least  10 
percent of the shares in this firm, then the investment is reported as portfolio 
investment. Similarly, if an individual investor purchases  more than  10 per- 
cent of a foreign firm, then this purchase is reported as a direct investment. In 
addition, the book figures for direct investment becomes  misleading due to 
inflation in the United States for the same reasons that book capital figures can 
be misleading for domestic firms.  Fortunately,  the direct investment  in the 
United  States tends to be quite recent, and the U.S. inflation rate during the 
1980s was relatively low.  Another complication is that the balance sheet fig- 
ures are based on infrequent benchmark surveys, with updates based on re- 
ported flows derived from a more limited sample. If investors transfer funds 
to the United  States through a third  country, perhaps to avoid domestic or 
withholding  taxes, then the reported flow figures but not the benchmark fig- 
ures will attribute the capital flow to this third country.31  For both reasons, the 
3 1.  The benchmark survey asks the ultimate beneficial  owner of  payments made to foreign 
investors. 36  Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
reported values can accumulate errors between benchmark surveys, as argued 
by  Slemrod (1990). We were not  in  a position  to correct  for any of  these 
possible measurement errors, so we simply assumed that they are uncorrelated 
with the measures of the tax variables. If so, then the measurement errors lead 
to a larger standard error of the regression but do not bias the coefficients. 
The resulting figures for the fraction of equity flows from each country to 
the United States that take the form of direct investment are reported in table 
1.10. As seen in the table,  these figures vary substantially across countries. 
On average, for example, 90.9 percent of the equity flows from Sweden to the 
United States take the form of direct investment, whereas the comparable fig- 
ure for Switzerland is only 23.3 percent. This strikingly low figure for Switz- 
erland suggests that portfolio investors from third countries,  who route their 
investments through  Swiss financial  intermediaries  to avoid  domestic  taxa- 
tion, may form an important if  not dominant component of the capital flows 
from Switzerland. Although in principle the U.S. data report the ultimate ben- 
eficial owner, Swiss banking regulations prevent the nationality of the ultimate 
owner from being revealed. Another country whose data might be suspect is 
the Netherlands.  Due to the low withholding taxes on interest payments from 
the United States to the Netherlands and the temtorial treatment of firms by 
the Netherlands,  multinationals often found it attractive to funnel investments 
through  the  Netherlands.  The high  fraction  of  direct  investment  from  the 
Netherlands, in spite of their lack of any capital controls, at least suggests that 
some of  it was owned  by investors in other countries,  in spite of  the U.S. 
attempt to trace the ultimate beneficial  owner. Given our concerns with the 
data from these two countries, we test below the sensitivity of our results to 
the exclusion of these two countries. 
One immediate observation from table 1.10 is that there is little systematic 
trend over the sample period or even substantial movement in the composition 
of equity flows, in spite of substantial changes in tax rates in these countries 
during the sample period.  This tells us immediately that any tax effects, if 
found. must be subtle. 
Table 1.10  Direct Investment Relative to Total Equity Position (percentage) 












85.0  88.2  87.8  85.5  88.9  87.0  76.0 
45.0  43.9  40.5  35.6  43.6  41.3  39.1 
33.1  41.0  38.7  36.2  40.5  38.8  40.1 
73.5  78.4  75.1  68.6  74.0  69.2  69.1 
81.1  86.1  83.9  83.3  84.9  83.7  80.3 
46.9  51.3  52.6  48.1  48.9  45.0  43.0 
39.4  78.2  80.5  77.4  75.3  62.3  57.3 
91.4  92.4  87.1  88.1  94.8  90.9  94.4 
18.0  19.8  21.5  20.6  24.2  22.0  20.2 
45.0  71.6  59.9  57.8  75.7  74.5  72.1 
62.3  67.7 
43.5  42.4 
44.7  47.7 
72.2  72.5 
81.5  79.1 
50.8  55.7 
64.9  60.8 
95.3  92.0 
24.9  29.1 
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1.4  Estimation 
1.4.1  Statistical Specification 
The basic model for countries using a credit system assumes that the frac- 
tion of equity flows from country i to country c that takes the form of direct 
investment rather than portfolio investment is a function of the three tax terms 
in equation (3), where 0  = a + bT,,.  Substituting for 0 gives four tax vari- 
ables, denoted by T,, T:, T:, and q,  where 
T, = (1 -  ~,)[w:,  + (1 + wf,h: - max(m,, wJ1  , 
T:  = (1 -  m:)[Ac,(T,, - 7,) - w:,(1  -  T,)]  , 
T:  = T,,T: ,  and 
T = abs(T; - 7:) . 
For countries exempting foreign-source income, T: = T: = 0. For Italy 
and France, we defined a fifth tax term,  = (1 -  ~,)(1 -  rn:)(l  -  e)(Tc, - 
w:,);  its coefficient is allowed to differ from those of the other tax terms. 
These five variables, plus R,, and C,,, will be used to forecast the value of 
the ratio of direct investment to direct plus portfolio investment. Denote this 
ratio by D,,.  This ratio by definition is between zero and one. A linear regres- 
sion with this ratio as the dependent variable would therefore suffer from the 
same problems that linear probability models do. We therefore decided to use 
a logit specification. Given that we observe the population outcome for the 
choice between the two forms of equity flows, we can estimate a logit model 
using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, with the dependent variable 
being log[DJ( 1 -  DJ]  .32 We  started out with the regression specification 
P4T + P,$  + P6K + P7Cs  + E'f  2 
where E,, captures the effects of factors omitted from the specification on the 
composition of equity flows. Based on the above discussion, the coefficients 
of T;, T,  R,,, and C,, should be positive, while those of T,, T:, and T should 
be negative. 
1.4.2  Regression Results 
In our initial specification, we  started with the following measures of  the 
above variables: First,  in defining T,, we  assumed personal tax evasion on 
portfolio investments but not on direct  investment^.^^ Second, we set T,,  equal 
32.  See, for example, Kmenta (1986) for a demonstration of  this. 
33.  One striking and anomalous implication of this assumption is that the correlation of the 
resulting values of T, with the dependent variable is .78, which is the highest painvise correlation 
with the dependent variable found in the study. Note that the sign of this correlation is the opposite 
of that forecast by the theory, a finding returned to below. 38  Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
to T;(T&),  which assumes that home governments rely on the U.S. definition 
of  corporate taxable income when taxing  repatriated earnings. Finally, we 
used our intermediate definition for Ccr. 
Using these variable definitions, we first estimated equation (4) using OLS. 
The resulting coefficient estimates are reported in column 1 of table 1.1  1, with 
t-statistics reported in parenthese~.~~  The results are rather mixed. The coeffi- 
cients of R&D and capital controls are both of the expected sign and statisti- 
cally significant. The other statistically significant variable is Tp,  but its coef- 
ficient is of the wrong sign. One hypothesis concerning the coefficient of T, is 
that countries which are less threatened by capital flight are more inclined to 
impose high personal tax rates, implying a reverse causation. We return to this 
hypothesis below.  Of the remaining coefficients, those of  T: and Tf have the 
expected signs, while those of T; and Tg do not. All these coefficients are very 
small and statistically insignificant, however. 
To  test for delayed responses to changes in  incentives, we  tried instead 
using lagged values of each of  the independent variables. Since we  did not 
collect tax data for 1979, the regression had to be run with data from 1981- 
89. The resulting coefficients on these lagged terms appear in column 2 of 
table 1.11. The fit is slightly better statistically. The coefficients of  and T 
now  have the expected signs,  though  they remain  small and insignificant. 
Otherwise,  any  differences from  the  original  specification are  minor.  We 
therefore chose to focus on use of contemporaneous data in order to avoid the 
loss of degrees of freedom. 
Both of these regressions were estimated using OLS. Yet  OLS is appro- 
priate only if the error terms in the regression are homoscedastic and indepen- 
dent across observations. Given the panel nature of the sample, however, the 
error terms for a given country may be correlated over time, because of, for 
example, omitted random or fixed effects. Ignoring these correlations at least 
results in a bias in the estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients. If 
omitted country  effects are correlated with  the included  independent vari- 
ables, then the initial coefficient estimates are themselves biased. 
To  test for the importance of these possible problems, we reestimated the 
initial equation, using both a fixed-effects estimator and a random-effects es- 
timator. The resulting coefficient estimates assuming fixed effects are reported 
in column 3 of table 1.1  I, whereas those assuming random effects appear in 
column 5.3s  As is apparent from the jump in the adjusted R2,  these country 
34.  As noted below, these t-statistics are biased at least because the residuals are not indepen- 
dent across observations due to country effects. 
35.  As shown in Fuller and Battese (1973), the random-effects estimator involves replacing the 
initial dependent variable, Y,,, and independent variables X,, with Y,, -  AY, andX,, - AX,,  respec- 
tively. Here Y, and X, are the mean values for country i over the full time period, and A  =  1 - 
[02/(crz + Tu~)]’~,  where$  is the estimated variance of the random effects, u2  is the variance of 
the idiosyncratic component of the residual, and 7‘ is the number of  years. As the estimate of  A 
approaches one, the random-effects estimator approaches the fixed-effects estimator. In this spec- 
ification, the estimate of  A  was 0.83, explaining the similarity of the coefficient estimates in the 
two cases. 39  Taxes and Form of Ownership of Foreign Corporate Equity 
Table 1.11  Test of Statistical Specification  (t-statistics  in parentheses) 
Excluding 
Fixed  Between  Random  Switzerland and 
OLS  Lag  Effects  Effects  Effects  the Netherlands 
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(0.54) 
































-  7.588 
(- 1.99) 


























































Note: The regression using lagged independent variables is based on ninety observations,  1981-1989,  by 
ten countries; all others based on one hundred observations,  1980-1989,  by ten countries. 
effects are highly significant as a group.36  If  the country effects are uncorre- 
lated with the other included variables, then a random-effects estimator would 
be  appropriate. To  test for this lack of correlation,  we  used  the procedure 
described in Hausman (1978), which compares statistically the coefficient es- 
timates from the fixed-effects and the random-effects regressions. The result- 
ing Hausman test statistic is 32.9, which has a P-value of only 0.00003 under 
the approximate x2  distribution,  and so strongly rejects the random-effects 
model. We  therefore focus on the results from the fixed-effects procedure. 
The coefficient estimates that result from the fixed-effects procedure differ 
substantially from those resulting from OLS, as is seen comparing column 1 
with  column 3. Comparing the fixed-effects coefficients with the forecasts 
from the theory, the results are again mixed. The coefficient of T, is now of 
the expected sign but statistically insignificant. The coefficients of T; and TB 
have both changed sign, both contrary to theoretical forecasts. Given their 
relative sizes, however, the net effect of the corporate surtax (6, + p37,,)  is 
still negative, as expected, as long as T=,  < .57, which is satisfied for all the 
countries in our sample. What is surprising is that the effect is more negative 
for countries with a smaller value of  T~~.  The coefficient of q,  describing the 
36.  The value of  the F-test for omitting the country dummies in the fixed-effects procedure is 
3.2, compared with a 5 percent significance level of  about I .35. 40  Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
corporate tax surcharge in Italy and France, has also changed to the expected 
sign and is statistically significant. While the coefficients of the R&D and the 
capital-controls variables still have the expected signs, they are no longer sig- 
nifi~ant.~~  The main  inconsistency with the theory is the coefficient of  q, 
which is not only of  the wrong  sign but highly  significant. The economic 
effect implied by  the coefficient is small, however. Given the logit specifica- 
tion for the dependent variable, ISD,/ST:~ = D,(1  -  D,,)p,  5  .25p,,  implying 
tiny effects of 7;  on D,,, given the various parameter values. Given the multiple 
ways in which tax rates enter the regression, and the small sample size, it is 
difficult to interpret each coefficient too strongly. 
The estimates for the country dummies in the fixed-effects regression are 
reported in table 1.12. Of the six countries with positive coefficients, four had 
capital controls during at least some part of  the sample period, and the data 
from one of the others (the Netherlands) are likely to overestimate the size of 
D,t.  These coefficients rather than the capital-controls dummy would capture 
the effects of capital controls if these effects did not disappear quickly with the 
official end  of  capital controls.  Learning lags could explain this  slow re- 
sponse, suggesting stronger effects of capital controls than are captured by the 
capital-controls dummy. The only significant negative coefficient is that for 
Switzerland, where we also view the data with suspicion. 
The differences between the fixed-effects results and the OLS results reflect 
the relative lack of time-series variation in the data but the substantial varia- 
tion in average levels of D,, across countries. In order to highlight these con- 
flicting aspects of the data, we also report results from a between-effects re- 
gression in column 4 of table 1.1  1, in which country averages of each variable 
over the ten-year period are used. The only coefficient whose sign is contrary 
to the theory is again T,. Given the small number of countries in the sample, 
it is not surprising that t-statistics for the coefficient estimates are so low. Since 
it may be difficult to capture the timing of tax effects adequately in the fixed- 
effects regressions, these results do provide an important independent view of 
the nature of these tax effects. 
Given our suspicions about the quality of the data from Switzerland and the 
Netherlands, we tried dropping these two countries from the sample. The last 
column in table 1.1  1 reports OLS results using the eight remaining countries. 
The main change is that the coefficients of  T'z  and T,b are now  dramatically 
larger and still of the correct sign. The coefficients of R&D and capital con- 
trols are also much larger. T, still has the wrong sign, however. 
In table 1.13, we explore a variety of alternative definitions of the variables. 
Column 1 repeats the fixed-effects results from table 1.11. In column 2, we 
try the stricter definition of the capital-controls variable; little changes, except 
that the coefficient of  C,, is now negative but insignificant. (Results with the 
37.  Our definition of  R&D is likely to measure poorly the timing of effects of  R&D, so that 
weaker estimated effects in the fixed-effects model should not be surprising. 41  Taxes and Form of Ownership of Foreign Corporate Equity 
Table 1.12  Country Effects 
































Table 1.13  Test of Alternative Definitions of Variables (t-statistics in parentheses) 
T<!  ,r<z  2515* 
Fixed  Capital  (average  (statutory  (without 
Effects  kontrols  No  corporation  corporation  fixed 
(table 1.1  1)  (strict)  Evasion  rate)  rate)  effects) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
TP  -0.281 
(-0.81) 
Tu  -  1.580 
(-1.25) 
Tb  2.792 
(0.41) 
T  -  7.588 
( -  1.99) 
T  -  1.677 
( -  3.39) 
R  7.439 
(0.86) 
C  0.099 
(1.31) 
Adjusted 
R2  0.90 
-0.012  -0.750  -0.284 
(-0.03)  (-1.26)  -0.88) 
-  1.281  -  1.548  3.352 
(-1.00)  (-1.24)  (1.95) 
0.195  3.934  -7.241 
(0.03)  (0.58)  -  2.49) 
-  10.417  -7.325  7.827 
(- 2.66)  (- 1.98)  (4.22) 
-  1.861  -  1.529  -  1.049 
( -  3.93)  ( -  2.98)  (- 2.70) 
4.347  6.094  1.434 
(0.50)  (0.70)  (0.20) 
-0.073  0.119  0.178 
(-0.88)  (1.53)  (2.72) 
0.90  0.90  0.92 
-0.309 
( -  0.84) 
7.783 
(1.16) 
-  15.397 
(-1.05) 
-  6.956 
(-1.85) 






















*2SLS = Two-stage least squares. 
looser definition of  C,, are very  close to those in column  1.) We  also tried 
alternative assumptions about personal tax evasion; again, little changes. The 
results assuming no evasion are reported in column 3. In columns 4 and 5, we 
measure T~~,  using the two alternative definitions explored above. The coeffi- 
cients of  the corporate surtax terms do turn out to be very  sensitive to the 
choice of this definition, although the other coefficients do not change much. 
When T~,  = T;, all three of these coefficients are of the expected sign; when 
the average corporate tax rate is used, T; and TE  have the expected signs, but 42  Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
flips to having the wrong sign.38  Before the behavioral effects of  this cor- 
porate surtax can be judged  with any confidence, more work  is needed to 
assess how foreign-source corporate income is measured in practice in these 
countries. 
One complication in interpreting any of the above results is that government 
policy variables could well be endogenous, given the importance of  tax eva- 
sion in many of  these countries. To begin with, capital controls make it much 
easier  to  impose  high  personal  tax  rates,  because evasion of  these taxes 
through investing abroad would be discouraged by the capital controls. This 
merely  suggests a  correlation  between the  independent variables,39  which 
does not create statistical bias. In addition, however, countries where inves- 
tors can for institutional or geographic reasons more easily shift funds abroad 
and should find it more costly to impose high personal tax rates. In itself, this 
suggests a reverse effect of the dependent variable on my,  biasing the coeffi- 
cient estimates generally but primarily creating a positive bias in the coeffi- 
cient of T,. The very high positive correlation in the data between T, and the 
dependent variable certainly suggests such a reverse causation. Countries fac- 
ing more pressure from capital flight, everything else equal, should also be 
more likely to adopt capital controls in order to lessen these pressures. This 
suggests that the residual will also be negatively correlated with C,.  We there- 
fore experimented with two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation methods, 
treating C,  and my  as endogenous. In particular, we collected data on the top 
marginal tax rate on wagesa  in each of these countries, and the ratio of  tax 
revenue to GDP, to use as instruments. The higher the tax rates are on labor 
income and the higher the amount of revenue the government desires, every- 
thing else equal, the more likely the country is to raise revenue from taxes on 
financial income and to impose capital controls to facilitate this taxation of 
financial income. Although no aggregate variable will be entirely exogenous, 
any effects of the dependent variable on these series should be trivial, making 
them reasonable instruments. The variables Tp,  T;, TZ, and C,  were all treated 
as endogenous. Rather than using the two instruments directly, we  included 
six variables constructed using  them,4i along with the remaining variables 
from the original regression, in each of  the four auxiliary regressions. The 
results, without fixed effects, are reported in column 6 of  table 1.13. These 
results ought to be compared with the OLS results in column 1 of table 1.1  1. 
38.  Because foreign direct investment and average tax rates can both be affected by  cyclical 
factors, these coefficients must be judged with some caution. 
39.  The correlation between T, and C,,  in our sample is 0.56, very much supporting this hy- 
pothesis. 
40. Given the equivalence in present value of value-added taxes and wage taxes, this variable 
captures the combined effects of both. 
41.  In particular, the six instruments were tax revenue/GDP, (tax revenue/GDP)*, T, with m,* 
replaced by the top marginal tax rate on labor, this variable squared, and both T: and Tp with m: 
replaced by the top marginal tax rate on labor. 43  Taxes and Form of Ownership of Foreign Corporate Equity 
As expected, the coefficient of T, dropped substantially and now has the ex- 
pected sign, while the coefficient of C,,  became dramatically large. Reverse 
causation does appear to be an important factor. The coefficients of  the re- 
maining tax variables all change sign, still leaving two with the sign forecast 
by the theory. They all remain statistically insignificant, however. 
Another possible complication is that capital controls may hinder any new 
portfolio flows but may  not  force investors to liquidate unreported invest- 
ments  they  have already made abroad.  Even though the U.S. government 
knows about the nationality of these portfolio investors, this does not imply 
that the home government is in a position to prosecute specific cases of  tax 
evasion or evasion of controls. To test for this, we allowed capital controls to 
reduce the sensitivity of the dependent variable to tax distortions, as well as 
to change the mean value of the dependent variable. In particular, we multi- 
plied each of the tax factors in equation (4) by  (1 -  ctCJ,  then estimated ct 
using a grid  Our expectation was that 0 <<  ct < 1. The resulting 
estimate of a,  starting from the original OLS specification, was -  1.55. Sur- 
prisingly, behavior seemed more sensitive to tax rates in countries with capital 
controls, though tax effects are still small. 
1.5  Conclusions 
Existing tax structures in our sample countries have important effects on the 
relative attractiveness to individuals of  buying foreign equity directly versus 
having a domestic firm they own buy these shares instead, particularly given 
the ease with which individuals appear able to evade domestic taxes on port- 
folio investments abroad. To  what degree do these distortions change behav- 
ior? The composition of equity flows does differ dramatically among these 
countries, and at least part of the explanation appears to be tax differences. 
Behavior did not seem to change much during the 1980s, however, in spite of 
the many large changes in tax rates that occurred during this period. Part of 
the explanation appears to be the importance of capital controls in many of the 
sample countries. Another problem, making inference more difficult, is that 
tax policy itself seemed to be endogenous-countries  where investors could 
more easily invest abroad were more likely to have lower tax distortions and 
to impose capital controls. In principle, the increasing international integra- 
tion of  financial markets and the steady reduction of  capital controls should 
lead to increasing responsiveness of  the composition of  international capital 
flows to tax distortions. As a result, countries will be under increasing pres- 
sure to reduce these tax distortions, and past behavior suggests that they will 
in fact respond to this pressure. 
42.  In doing this, we used our loosest definition of C,,, because the controls in France should 
reduce the responsiveness  of D,,  to taxes even if they do not discourage ownership of foreign equity 
per se. 44  Roger H. Gordon and Joosung Jun 
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Comment  Alberto Giovannini 
This very careful study uses a new data set, compiled by the U.S.  Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, to evaluate the effects of  taxes on the composition of 
foreign investment (direct investment versus portfolio investment). 
In a nutshell, the regression equations estimated by Gordon and Jun con- 
tain, on the left side, a measure of the ratio of portfolio investment flows over 
direct investment flows into the United States. The data are a cross section and 
time series from ten industrial countries. The explanatory variables are tax 
and nontax variables. The tax variables include a measure of the tax advantage 
of portfolio investment arising from the ability of individuals to claim credits 
on withholding taxes and a measure of the tax advantage of portfolio invest- 
ment arising whenever corporations are in a deficit credit position. Corporate 
investment, however, is more attractive whenever transfer pricing allows a 
reduction of the total tax burden of the corporation: this effect is entered sepa- 
rately in the regressions. Gordon and Jun also include nontax variables, such 
as the presence of controls on portfolio investments by individuals, and R&D 
intensity (the latter is presumably a good proxy for the incentives to locate 
overseas that arise from ownership of distinct products or technologies). 
The empirical analysis of  international capital flows has a long tradition. 
Twenty years ago, the implications of  the portfolio model for international 
capital flows were discovered, which led to substantial research with often 
disappointing results (see, for example, the essays in Machlup, Salant, and 
Tarshis 1972). Gordon and Jun pay little attention to the issues that inflamed 
researchers twenty years ago (stock versus flow equilibria) but concentrate on 
deriving consistent tax variables. Like many of their predecessors, they fail to 
establish convincing empirical evidence in favor of their own chosen model 
of  international capital flows. Their results beg the question of  why  it is so 
difficult to explain observed capital flows data. I suggest a number of possible 
causes of this difficulty: 
1. The quality of capital JIows data. Gordon and Jun use data constructed 
by  Bureau of Economic Analysis officials. The fact that the data are not pub- 
lished makes me suspect that the agency might regard them as not perfectly 
reliable. Although I do not think this is enough of a reason for economists to 
shy away from unpublished data, I suspect that in this case putting the data 
with errors on the left side of the regression equations might not be enough. 
As the International Monetary Fund (1987) study on the world current ac- 
count discrepancy has shown, statistical errors in the data are often caused by 
underreporting, which is caused by  tax  evasion. Hence, tax  variables are 
likely to be significantly correlated with errors in measurement of the depen- 
dent variable in Gordon and Jun’s regressions. 
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2. The specijcation of  the regression equations. As I mentioned above, the 
innovation of the portfolio approach in international capital flows was to re- 
gress capital flows on first differences in interest rates. The assumption was 
that stock equilibrium holds at every point in time. Gordon and Jun regress 
capital flows on variables that represent their relative profitability. The basic 
problem of their regression is that they might have inconsistent long-run pre- 
dictions. For example, they might predict a permanent increase in the share of 
portfolio investment in total capital Jlows in response to a given tax incentive: 
this  is,  of  course,  a prediction that does not produce constant  steady-state 
portfolio shares. 
3. The choice of  explanatory variables. It is not clear that the tax variables 
constructed by Gordon and Jun represent the relevant variables faced by inter- 
national investors. In international finance, the actual intermediate stops made 
by investments from country A to country B matter tremendously. Tax havens 
permit corporations and individuals to substantially lower taxes on foreign- 
source incomes. Tax havens are heavily used: for example, data from the Jap- 
anese Ministry of Finance (Annual Report of the International Finance Bu- 
reau,  1985) show that the share of  direct investments out of Japan into tax 
havens was as high as 27 percent in 1983. 
Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that a corporation in Italy wishing to 
invest in the United States finds that the cheapest way of doing so is through a 
subsidiary in the Netherlands Antilles.  Under that hypothesis, the tax vari- 
ables calculated by Gordon and Jun would not be the relevant variables faced 
by  such corporation. At the same time, however, we would not observe any 
corporate investment flows from Italy to the United States. This discussion 
suggests that, to the extent that data on cross-border investments between the 
countries in the sample are observed, the investments might be motivated by 
factors other than  the tax factors which are the focus of  this paper,  as the 
authors themselves acknowledge. The nontax factors used by Gordon and Jun 
are simply too few to provide enough explanatory power. In addition, even if 
these additional factors are orthogonal to the tax variables,  one should not 
expect their coefficients to have signs consistent with the theory, as long as 
cheaper options to move investment funds from one country to another are 
available. 
In summary, I found Gordon and Junk paper to  be both stimulating and 
careful. I suspect, however, that the problem they attack is still too big for the 
data and models currently at our disposal. 
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